UG-CLAT LEGAL REASONING QUIZ 9

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Question 1:

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Article 29 (2) -

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Question 2:

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them is prohibited under-

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Question 3:

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The Supreme Court held the Communal G.O. of State of Madras as

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Question 4:

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

As per the Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, how many seats were to be allotted to those, who were Hindus, but not the Brahmin?

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Question 5:

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) of Article 29 is a right which an individual citizen has

General question arising in the mind of the most of the Indian citizens, why should the government provide caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats?State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)case is one of the first cases that dealt with the question of reservation in admission to the educational institutions. In 1927, the Province of Madras had issued a government order, known as the Communal G.O., with regard to the admission of students to the 4 Engineering and 4 Medical Colleges of the state. Out of 725 seats, 62 seats were reserved for student coming from outside of the state and for discretionary allotment by the state. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were to be apportioned on the basis of Communal G.O. of 1927. As per Communal G.O, out of every fourteen seats, six were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), two were to be allotted to Backward Hindus, two were to be allotted to Brahmins, two were to be allotted to Harijans, one to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and one to Muslims.

In 1950, Smt Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution, complaining a breach of her fundamental right under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the state. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. She stated that she was not allowed to get admission into college as she belonged to the Brahmin community and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus ‘restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing the Communal G.O. The High Court of Madras delivered its judgement and ruled in favour of Champakam Dorairajan. The State of Madras appealed this ruling in the Supreme Court, and thus the case came before the Supreme Court of India. 

The Supreme Court held that the Communal G.O. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 29(2) and was therefore void under Article 13. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. On other hand, they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.  

‘Champakam Dorairajan’case along with‘Romesh Thappar’case necessitated constitutional amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) to Article 15, which is: ‘Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe’. The case also decided the question of supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Question 6:

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Res-judicata is based on the maxim

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Question 7:

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Res-judicata applies when

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Question 8:

Res-judicata means “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule of res-judicata, is based on the maxim nemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause and interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium i.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

The principle of res-judicata applies between

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Question 9:

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Mr. X filed a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of Indian Constitution and they were dismissed. Then after he files for Article 32 in Supreme Court for the same relief and same grounds. In such condition,

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

Question 10:

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.

The nature of res-judicata is

Res-judicatameans “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The rule ofres-judicata, is based on the maximnemo debit lis vexari pro una et endem causa, i.e., no one ought to be troubled twice for one and the same cause andinterest rei publicae ut sit finis litiumi.e. it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit. Thus, the rule of res judicata is based on two principles, namely, public policy is, there should be an end to litigation and secondly, to avoid hardship on the individual. 

The rule of res-judicata as laid down in section 11 of the CPC is as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 

The principle of res judicata applies between co-defendants and also co-plaintiffs. Section 11 is mandatory and not directory in nature. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 Evidence Act, 1872 on grounds of fraud or collusion. Gross negligence in former suit doesn’t amount to fraud or collusion and thus acts as bar to subsequent suit.